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Objective:  The  overall  research  objective  was  to theoretically  and  empirically  develop  the  ideas  around
a  system  of safety  management  practices  (ten  practices  were  elaborated),  to  test their  relationship  with
objective  safety  statistics  (such  as  accident  rates),  and  to explore  how  these  practices  work  to  achieve
positive  safety  results  (accident  prevention)  through  worker  engagement.
Method: Data  were  collected  using  safety  manager,  supervisor  and  employee  surveys  designed  to  assess
and  link  safety  management  system  practices,  employee  perceptions  resulting  from  existing  practices,
and  safety  performance  outcomes.
Results: Results  indicate  the  following:  there  is  a signiﬁcant  negative  relationship  between  the presence
of  ten individual  safety  management  practices,  as  well  as the composite  of  these  practices,  with  accident
rates;  there  is a signiﬁcant  negative  relationship  between  the  level  of  safety-focused  worker  emotional
and  cognitive  engagement  with accident  rates;  safety  management  systems  and  worker  engagement
levels  can  be used  individually  to  predict  accident  rates;  safety  management  systems  can  be  used  to
predict  worker  engagement  levels;  and  worker  engagement  levels  act as  mediators  between  the  safety
management  system  and  safety  performance  outcomes  (such  as  accident  rates).
Implications: Even  though  the presence  of  safety  management  system  practices  is  linked  with incident
reduction  and  may  represent  a necessary  ﬁrst-step  in accident  prevention,  safety  performance  may  also
depend  on  mediation  by  safety-focused  cognitive  and  emotional  engagement  by workers.  Thus,  when
organizations  invest  in a safety  management  system  approach  to reducing/preventing  accidents  and
improving  safety  performance,  they  should  also  be concerned  about  winning  over the  minds  and  hearts
of  their  workers  through  human  performance-based  safety  management  systems  designed  to  promote
and  enhance  worker  engagement.
Open access under CC BY license.. Introduction
Organizations often adopt safety management system or
ehavior-based system approaches to managing their safety
unctions in an attempt to achieve performance excellence. Orga-
izations typically prefer adopting one system versus the other
robably due to both pragmatic (e.g., resource and implementation
onstraints) and philosophical reasons. Commonly adopted safety
anagement system approaches are described in consensus
tandards such as OHSAS 18001:2007 (British Standards Institute,
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2007), ANSI/AIHA Z10-2012 (American National Standards
Institute, 2012), and the OSHA’s Voluntary Protection Program
(VPP) (Occupational Safety and Health Administration, 2011).
These consensus standards do not strongly emphasize the “human
element” when developing and implementing the required pro-
cesses and procedures described in these standards. Conversely,
traditional behavior-based systems adopt observational method-
ologies where workers use a list of deﬁned critical behaviors,
observe workers for these behaviors, and provide feedback. How-
ever, more advanced behavior-based systems (e.g., antecedent-
behavior-consequence systems; DO-IT systems) uncover and
correct organizational barriers (i.e., management system deﬁcien-
cies) that inhibit safe acts (and therefore accidents) from occurring.The reality is that aspects of both of these systems are probably
needed to effectively manage safety performance in organizations.
An argument can be made that the two types of systems described
above are complementary and that their respective strengths
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an be merged into a more balanced and comprehensive system
o managing safety and in preventing accidents from occurring
DeJoy, 2005). Both aspects are prominently featured in the human
erformance approach to safety management which attempts to
nderstand and eliminate the causes of human error (and thus
ccidents or events) in the workplace from both safety manage-
ent and behavioral systems perspectives (see Fig. 1). The human
erformance approach to safety management in organizations can
e viewed as potentially spanning the rational, natural and open
ystem organizational approaches as described by Scott (1981).
In  human performance theory, mission, goals, policies, pro-
esses and programs (i.e., safety management system components)
ave latent organizational weaknesses that could give rise to
awed defenses and error precursors within organizations (Reason,
990, 1997). These error precursors are unfavorable conditions
hat increase the probability of human errors while perform-
ng speciﬁc actions. Common error traps include time pressure,
ental pressure, fatigue, being new to the task, distractions, and
verconﬁdence (U.S. Department of Energy, 2009). In the human
erformance system, human error is merely a symptom of some
rouble deeper in the system (Dekker, 2006).
It is probably inevitable that latent organizational weaknesses
and resulting ﬂawed defenses and error precursors) will arise
ithin a system of safety management practices for a number of
ractical reasons. First, safety management systems cannot plan
or, control, and defend against all potential error-prone situa-
ions because in doing so work would need to be planned and
ontrolled to such a high and constraining degree that it would
e time-consuming, unworkable and uneconomical. Second, safety
anagement systems tend to be institutionalized through policies,
lans, procedures, and processes and therefore are not easily and
eadily adaptable to the natural and inevitable variations occur-
ing in work being conducted and the hazards being encountered.
astly, humans, who are fallible, design and implement safety man-
gement systems. Therefore, the lifeblood of a safety management
ystem is shared with the managers and workers who have birthed
he system and have given it daily life (and sometimes death).
From  a behavioral perspective, workers bring their beliefs,
alues, and vision to the design and implementation of safety
anagement systems and ultimately in performing work. In partic-
lar, the individual worker interfaces with the safety management
ystem by participating or engaging (or by not participating or
ngaging) in the system. Motivation to participate can be affected
y workers’ beliefs and values, which can impact the workers’
egree, quality and consistency of participation. When accidentsausation (U.S. Department of Energy, 2009).
occur,  the behaviors of workers, who  are at the “sharp edge” of
accidents and who interface with both the hazards and the safety
management system itself, are closely scrutinized during acci-
dent investigations. This inquiry focus most likely leads to the
often quoted and misapplied statistic that the vast majority of all
accidents are caused by unsafe acts (i.e., human behavior) (Seo,
2005).
In the ﬁeld of human performance improvement, there are a
number of human performance tools that can be used to systemat-
ically reduce the chance of human error. These tools can be viewed
as vehicles for providing mental and social skills that complement
a worker’s technical skills to promote safe and efﬁcient task perfor-
mance, such as carving out time to think about work, in particular
the critical steps of that work (Muschara, 2012). Some human per-
formance improvement tools commonly used include conducting
pre- and post-task brieﬁngs, performing peer-checking, and using
self-checking approaches such as “take-a-minute,” STAR (Stop-
Think-Act-Review), and “stop and seek” for workers who do not
believe they have the appropriate knowledge to make decisions
(Wachter and Yorio, 2013). These human performance tools are
emphatically “worker-centric” in that they engage workers to have
more situational awareness concerning their safety, error traps
present, tasks to be performed, and conditions/surroundings.
Worker engagement in safety may  systematically act to reduce
the probability of human errors from occurring by making work-
ers more involved with and aware of their tasks/surroundings and
associated risks, as well as error traps that could be present. Thus,
increased levels of worker engagement in safety activities could
possibly be related to increased safety performance as measured
by standard safety outcomes (e.g., accident rates).
The overall goals of the two  studies described in this article
are two-fold: to theoretically and empirically develop the ideas
around a system of safety management practices and to test its
relationship with safety performance statistics such as accident
rates (i.e., supporting a safety management system approach to
managing safety performance) and to theoretically and empirically
explore how these practices work (largely using a high perfor-
mance work practice perspective) to achieve positive safety results
through worker engagement (i.e., supporting an approach medi-
ated by worker perceptions). If these goals are achieved, then the
human performance approach to preventing accidents (i.e., a sys-
tem comprised of both safety management and behavior-based
system components presented in Fig. 1 and a system which is also
represented by the person being the center of the safety manage-
ment system presented in Fig. 2) is supported.
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research exists to support the link between speciﬁc safety manage-Fig. 2. Human performance: the center of any safety management system
dapted  from Fisher (2012)
In these studies we ﬁrst looked at discerning a list of mean-
ngful objective practices (based on stakeholder input) that could
omprise a safety management system in line with viewing organi-
ations as rational systems that pursue relatively speciﬁc goals and
xhibit a relatively high formalized social structure. This perspec-
ive is in synch with the most commonly used safety management
ystem consensus standards in that these practices are described
argely independently of individual/variable actors (i.e., work-
rs) who implement these practices/processes in organizations. In
hort, we devised a list of integrated practices/processes (some
f which are actual components within these consensus stan-
ards) that if present could theoretically and empirically be linked
ith safety performance without major consideration of articu-
ating the behavioral components within these constructs. Thus,
e initially reiﬁed to some extent the characteristics of our safety
anagement system component’s constructs from employee per-
eptual deﬁnitions – largely to assess if the management system
ractices can be viewed from mainly a structural and objective
erspective (such as that exhibited in most safety management
onsensus standards) and to determine if these objective high per-
ormance work practices would impact accident statistics. But, it
hould be noted that some of our practices are clearly designed
rom an interaction perspective which necessarily involves workers
i.e., employee involvement, cooperation facilitation, and commu-
ication and information perspective); however, these are related
o processes being in place to achieve interaction goals, rather
han promoting certain workers’ perceptions. Then, informed by
ocial psychology research, we investigated the more subjective
orker perceptual inﬂuences present in organizations and linked
he extent of these perceptions with the degree of safety man-
gement system practices being implemented in order to discern
heir combined effects on safety performance. In this way, using
 stepwise approach (ﬁrst attempting to show that high perfor-
ance work practices impact both worker perceptions and safety
erformance, and second attempting to show that worker percep-
ions can also impact high performance work practices and safety
erformance) we are responding to the criticism of rational sys-
em theory: that it largely ignores the impact of environment and
ehavior on the organization and organizational performance. This
ualistic approach is similar to that presented by Fernández-Mun˜iz
t al. (2007) in their model linking manager commitment to safety
erformance through the two independent constructs of employee
nvolvement and the safety management system. and Prevention 68 (2014) 117–130 119
1.1. A system of safety management practices
A safety management system consists of programs, processes,
policies, and procedures for which there is a formal func-
tion overseeing their development, implementation, and ongoing
administration. They are usually codiﬁed in writing and issued
as approved documents that specify functions, roles, responsibili-
ties, accountabilities and authorities. Safety management practices
comprising this system can be conceptualized as global data points.
Klein and Kozlowski (2000) describe global data points as being
top-town and largely within the control of organizational man-
agers. Bliese and Jex (2002) further describe them as objective
group properties that vary between groups but not within them. In
terms of the existence of these global data points, they either exist
or they do not exist in an objective sense and act to create a context
in which workers carry out their work. These safety management
system practices do not represent a form of context comprised
through perceptual processes of workers such as “safety climate” or
“management commitment” (Guldenmund, 2010). Thus, measures
(such as worker engagement or sense of workplace justice) which
tap into employee perceptions may  be considered as consequences
of the objective safety management system practices that are in
place.
Within the human resource ﬁeld, when systems of best prac-
tices are considered, they are referred to as high performance work
practices (HPWPs) (Guthrie, 2001; Huselid, 1995). HPWPs can be
conceptualized as a group of separate but interconnected human
resource practices that collectively recruit, select, develop, moti-
vate, and retain workers (Way, 2002). HPWP theory further argues
that workers are capable of continuous improvement and, when
motivated, will perform at higher levels (Pfeffer, 1998).
HPWP  theory can be applied to a system of safety management
practices in order to gain a more precise understanding of their
functioning and impacts from a human performance perspective.
Safety management system practices may  be viewed as having
characteristics of HPWPs. These safety management practices are
designed to inﬂuence employee knowledge, skills, motivation,
decision-making, attitudes, and perceptions (right side of Fig. 1).
Further, these safety management system practices are consistent
with the premise that organizations can gain sustainable com-
petitive advantages by utilizing strategic, synergistic systems of
interconnected safety practices designed to keep their employees
working safely and without incident.
Both the theoretical and empirical links between general (e.g.,
non-safety oriented) HPWPs and occupational safety have been
previously examined (Barling and Zacharatos, 1999; Parker et al.,
2001; Zacharatos et al., 2005). This literature set is grounded in
the premise that traditional HPWPs used to generally manage
performance and efﬁciency behaviors are also likely to inﬂuence
important safety behaviors (Parker et al., 2001). The traditional
HPWPs considered in these models consist of job autonomy, high-
quality jobs, employment security, transformational leadership,
extensive training, information sharing, measurement of manage-
ment practices, selective hiring, and reduced status distinctions.
These studies provide a strong foundation for the premise that a
system of safety management practices can be used speciﬁcally to
improve safety behaviors and organizational safety performance.
We  recognize that general HPWPs can indeed inﬂuence occupa-
tional safety performance, but we  also contend that organizations
rely on various sets of safety management system practices
designed to manage human safety performance either directly or
indirectly. Other theorists have come to a similar conclusion andment practices and safety performance. For example, Aksorn and
Hadikusumo (2008) found that safety management system prac-
tices including incident investigations, jobsite inspections, control
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f subcontractors, and safety incentives decreased incident rates;
obsite inspections, incident investigations, job hazard analysis,
afety committees and safety recordkeeping decreased the number
f unsafe acts that occurred; and incident investigations, jobsite
nspections, job hazard analysis, and safety auditing were most
ffective in reducing the number of unsafe conditions. Vinodkumar
nd Bhasi (2011) found signiﬁcantly differing perceptions of the
inkage between safety management systems and safety perfor-
ance in OHSAS 18001-certiﬁed organizations versus those that
ere not certiﬁed. This limited research only measured percep-
ions of safety management systems to inﬂuence behavior and
id not consider objective, measurable performance data, such as
otal recordable case (TRC) or Days Away Restricted or Transferred
DART) case rates. The U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Admin-
stration (OSHA) claims that on average VPP-certiﬁed organizations
ave DART case rates approximately 50% below the industrial mean
ased upon the injury and illness data submitted annually by the
PP participants (Occupational Safety and Health Administration,
011). Despite these general claims of safety performance impacts
ue to safety management systems being in place, the literature
s somewhat limited in its reporting of and explaining the effect
f individual safety management system practices (which char-
cterize and comprise the safety management system) on safety
erformance and accident prevention.
In order to develop a characterization model for safety manage-
ent practices, we started with a review of the existing literature
e.g., Makin and Winder, 2008 and those highlighted above) and
e subsequently conducted a series of exploratory interviews
ith representatives from large U.S. domestic and multi-national
rganizations as well as human performance consulting ﬁrms.
hese organizations (most of which were in safety- and human
erformance-critical sectors) were known to be leaders in the ﬁeld
f human performance. These representatives consisted of safety
xecutives, corporate strategic advisors, global safety and health
anagers, and human performance consultants. Our role was  to
sk a series of open ended and clarifying questions designed to
nderstand the types of management system practices used to for-
ally manage human safety performance within organizations.
 consistent set of ten formalized practices emerged: employee
nvolvement; pre- and post-task safety reviews; safe work proce-
ures; hiring for safety; cooperation facilitation; safety training;
nformation sharing; accident investigation; detection and moni-
oring of deviation; and safe task assignment. Of these ten practices,
wo practices (i.e., safety training and information sharing) were
imilar to the six dimensions described by Fernández-Mun˜iz et al.
2007) in their set of practices used to analyze causal relationship
ith safety performance.
The  questions chosen to reﬂect each safety management
ractice  were chosen through the same qualitative, exploratory
nterview approach used to identify the practices themselves.
uring a follow-up interview process with each of the original par-
icipants, representatives were asked to generate the items that
eﬂect the most effective way the practices are administered. Thus,
he items chosen to measure the individual safety management
ractices reﬂect what was indicated as the internal conﬁgurations
hat are likely to result in maximum safety performance beneﬁt.
Table  1 describes these ten management system practices com-
rising a safety management system and the theoretical and human
erformance framework for including them in this research study.
here is some overlap in the item’s content. For example, the com-
unication and information sharing practice includes an item that
easures the degree to which results from accident investigationsre shared among the workforce. In this case we felt, in agreement
ith the focus group, that this important item tapped more into
haracterizing the process of information sharing, rather than the
rocess of conducting an accident investigation. We  suggest that and Prevention 68 (2014) 117–130
this slight overlap in the limited number of cases is not indicative of
decreased validity for each of the practices but points more toward
evidence of the connected and synergistic fashion in which they are
suspected to function. The rigorous, iterative process used to select
the practices and the items within those practices provides con-
tent validity to the measurement model used for our two research
studies that were conducted (study number one and study number
two).
In addition, some of the ten management system practices com-
prising our safety management system (i.e., accident investigation,
detection and monitoring, training) are also major components
contained in common safety management system consensus stan-
dards. In fact all of the ten practices could be inferred in some
way as being possible approaches to implementing various consen-
sus standard requirements, although it may  not be directly stated
in these standards. However, the deﬁnitions/characteristics of our
system components are much more detailed than those contained
in consensus standard language. This is because these consensus
standards largely deﬁne their components from a process output
perspective (i.e., what these components are designed to accom-
plished overall), while our components are also deﬁned by their
internal conﬁgurations (i.e., how these components function to con-
trol risk by describing their characteristics).
1.2. Worker cognitive and emotional safety engagement
Safety management systems are developed and implemented to
identify, evaluate, control and ultimately reduce safety risk and to
generate numerous layers of defenses that prevent accidents from
occurring. But as explained previously these safety management
systems are ﬂawed both during their development and imple-
mentation (accidents still occur!), perhaps due to the fact that
these systems cannot anticipate and control all possible work situ-
ations and that these systems tend to be slow to adapt to changing
situations or uncertainty because of their rigid, controlled and com-
plicated structures. In addition, where work is being conducted,
there is a human, who  is capable of error, connecting that work
with the safety management system. Active errors occur at this
“sharp” edge, where the safety management system touches the
worker and the worker touches the work to be performed.
What general offenses and defenses do workers have within
their control that will keep them safe and make them aware of
their ever-changing surroundings, error traps, and the fallibility of
safety management systems and themselves? The answer, perhaps,
is in the ability of workers to become generally engaged with their
work and more speciﬁcally in the safety aspects of their work.
When  engaged, an organization’s members complete work roles
by driving personal energy into physical, cognitive and emotional
labors. Engagement involves investing the “hands, head & heart”
(Ashforth and Humphrey, 1995) of workers in active, full work per-
formance. Engagement occurs when individuals are emotionally
connected to others and cognitively vigilant (Harter et al., 2002;
Kahn, 1990). Connection and vigilance can be described as being
psychologically present, fully there, attentive, feeling, integrated,
and focused in their role performance.
The speciﬁc mediating role of worker engagement on perfor-
mance was  initially explored by Rich et al. (2010). Their research
explicitly positioned engagement as a motivational concept which
can lead to desired behavioral consequences. As indicated by Rich
et al., this emphasis is consistent with Ashforth and Humphrey’s
(1995) argument that because engagement accounts for the simul-
taneous expression of both strong motivation and psychological
involvement, it is an important motivational concept with great
potential to improve understanding of the mechanism through
which contextual perceptions and behavioral tendencies ulti-
mately inﬂuence behavior and performance.
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Table  1
Safety  management system practices, theoretical framework for inclusion, and survey items used in research study number one and study number two.
Safety management system
practices
Theoretical  framework Survey items used to create safety management system
practice  composite
Employee involvement/inﬂuence Employee inﬂuence over safety management system practices,
programs  and safe work procedures works by actively
facilitating safe attitudes and behaviors. As employee inﬂuence
over  safety practices increases they are more likely to defend
their  existence and adopt the value of working safely and
encouraging  others to do so. For example, as employees are
given  the opportunity to contribute to the development of safe
work  procedures they are more likely to identify with those
safe  work procedures and thus follow them and further
encourage others to do so to. Employee inﬂuence and
involvement over safety practices can have a strong impact on
safety  culture and climate as the collective workforce has a
stake  in the safety program’s success. Also employee
engagement has been directly correlated to the amount of
involvement  that employees have in their work processes
(Lockwood, 1997). Employee inﬂuence and/or participation in
developing and implementing safety management system
practices,  processes, programs and procedures functions by
actively  facilitating employee engagement.
• Employees are involved in the process of creating safe
work  instructions.
•  Employees can inﬂuence STOP work criteria.
• Employees are involved in devising solutions to incidents
that  resulted from human error.
• Employees are involved in performing safety
observations of other employees.
•  Employees are involved in conducting accident
investigations.
• Employees are involved in the hiring for safety of their
peers.
Pre-  and post-task safety reviews All routine or non-routine tasks require some element of
safety  and health risk. When employees perform routine tasks,
they  are more likely to become complacent and fall into the
cognitive  decision-making traps such as anchoring bias
(relying  primarily on the outcome of previous task
executions), knowledge bias (relying primarily on current
knowledge  and overlooking the safest options), optimism bias
(the  tendency to underestimate true risk involved in a task),
overconﬁdence bias (overestimation of one’s own ability to
avoid  potential harmful outcomes of a task), and other biases.
When  tasks are non-routine the actual risks involved may  be
unknown.  A disciplined practice of reviewing the safety
considerations of routine and non-routine tasks helps facilitate
maximum  cognitive concentration on the safety elements of
the task and situational awareness. Post-task safety reviews
help  solidify those elements and increase the likelihood of
safety  concentration in later tasks. These post-task reviews
also  allow for generating lessons learned for application to
future  work and this acts as a means to achieve continual
improvement of safety performance.
•  How often are pre-task safety reviews done (i.e. planning
and  reviewing the safety considerations of the task)?
•  When pre-task safety reviews are done, a review of
critical  steps is conducted.
•  When pre-task safety reviews are done, error likely
steps/situations are addressed.
•  When pre-task safety reviews are done, the worst thing
that  could happen is discussed.
• When pre-task safety reviews are done, special safe work
procedures including PPE is discussed.
• When pre-task safety reviews are done, energy sources
requiring isolation are addressed.
• When pre-task safety reviews are done, STOP work
criteria are discussed.
•  After ﬁnishing a task, employees participate in reviewing
the  safety aspects of their task.
Safe work procedures Safe work procedures are developed to provide the steps
necessary  to safety execute tasks free of injury and illness. They
provide  important and consistent information to workers of
what  is expected of them from a safety perspective. There can
be  considerable variation in safe work procedure development,
content and administration. Safe work procedures can play a
vital role in ensuring that routine, complex tasks are executed
safely.  Safe work procedures can be developed with employee
inﬂuence  and updated at varying frequencies.
• Percent of routine tasks that safe work procedures have
been  developed for.
•  Percent of high risk jobs for which hazard analyses have
been  completed.
•  Hazard analyses previously performed are thorough and
robust.
•  Safe work safe work procedures are reviewed and
updated when necessary.
•  Safety “lessons learned” are considered when reviewing
and  updating safe work procedures.
• Safe work procedures contain a warning about the
potential  consequences of deviation.
Hiring for safety Selective hiring for safety works by hiring employees who  are
less  likely to get injured and who  have an intrinsic value for
safe  work. Hiring for safety is a management system practice
that  can consist of elements such as ensuring physically
capability, the absence of substance abuse, multiple
standardized interviews, and a process to instill the value of
safety  prior to hire.
•  The safety values and beliefs of this organization are
discussed  in the interviews with potential employees.
•  Only the best people are hired to work in this
organization.
•  Number of interviews a job applicant goes through prior
to  a job offer.
•  Job applicants go through background checks.
• Job applicants have to pass a physical stating that they
can  physically do the job.
• Job applicants undergo a drug test prior to being hired.
Cooperation  facilitation Safety can be viewed as a personal and or collective endeavor.
In  today’s workplace tasks are becoming increasingly
interdependent. Where tasks are interdependent, employees
need  to rely on one another for information and cooperation to
perform  tasks successfully and without incident. Thus an
increasing  concern for current safety programs is to devise
ways  to formally link employees in information sharing and to
encourage  a willingness to help each other and communicate
freely  about key safety consideration in interdependent task
execution.
•  Employees are encouraged to cooperate with each other
on  resolving safety issues.
•  Formal communication mechanisms among co-workers
are  robust enough to ensure that information being shared
covers  all necessary safety information.
• Formal mechanisms are utilized to ensure that key safety
information  is communicated between off-going and
on-coming shifts.
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Table  1 (Continued)
Safety management system
practices
Theoretical  framework Survey items used to create safety management system
practice  composite
Safety training Safety training is a fundamental safety practice emphasized by
most federal and state safety and health legislative bodies.
Safety  training works by increasing knowledge and awareness
of  safety and health in the workplace. There is considerable
variation in the ways that safety training is designed and
delivered.  For example, some organizations may elect to train
employees  to minimum compliance objectives in one 10 h
session per year. A different company might train employees
20  h per year in 2 h increments and go beyond compliance
requirements to incorporate content addressing the art and
science  of hazard recognition, evaluation, and control.
• Employees are formally trained on the safety aspects of
their  job.
•  Number of hours of formal safety training.
• Throughout the course of the year, how often employees are
formally  trained on the safety aspects of their job. (seven
point  scale, Never to Always).
•  Employee safety training incorporates elements of hazard
recognition and avoidance.
Communication and information
sharing
Communication and information sharing is tied to the
frequency  and methods (distinct from safety training) of
emphasizing  knowledge and the importance of safe work.
Companies  might use print media (e.g., posters and payroll
stuffers)  to increase cognitive awareness of safe work and
emphasize  its importance. Companies can also share
information concerning near misses and incidents experienced
within  and outside the immediate establishment.
• Employees are informed of new or revised safety rules
and  safe work instructions.
•  Employees are informed about potential hazards in the
workplace  or their tasks.
• Information about the importance of working safely is
communicated to employees (e.g., print media, posters,
and  payroll stuffers).
•  Employees are informed about safety incidents
experienced in other similar organizations.
• Employees are informed about safety incidents and/or
near  misses experienced by other employees.
• When safety incidents do occur, the results of the
investigation are shared among the workforce.
Accident  investigation When safety incidents (i.e. employee injuries and near misses)
do  occur, organizations can investigate those accidents with
the  ultimate goal of reducing the probability of the event
occurring  again. Accident investigation management practices
can  differ substantially in administration. For example,
organizations may  investigate incidents within the shift that it
occurred  as opposed to within 48 h
• Incident investigations seek to uncover potential reasons
why  human error might have contributed to the incident.
•  How soon accidents are investigated.
• Accident investigations are conducted by a team of
individuals consisting of employee representative(s), a safety
representative, and the injured employee’s immediate
supervisor.
Detection  and monitoring Detection and monitoring works to reinforce other safety
management system practices used by an organization.
Organizations can create and utilize checklists used by
supervisors  and other employees to detect situations and
behaviors  that may  not be in line with the safety rules and
requirements  in place. When a violation is observed
organizations can handle it in different ways. For example,
negative  sanctions can be divvied out to an employee for a
deviation  from a safe work rule or procedure while other
organizations may  use a constructive problem solving
approach.
• Safety checklists have been developed corresponding to
possible  workplace hazardous conditions.
• Safety checklists have been developed which correspond
to  possible workplace at risk behaviors.
• Safety observations target behaviors that deviate from
safe  work instructions.
•  Safe work instruction deviations result in negative
consequences for employees.
•  Deviations from safe work instructions are tracked and
monitored.
Safe  task assignment
(task-employee matching)
Organizations may  take into account how well suited an
employee  is for a particular task in order to maximize the
likelihood  that the task will be executed successfully without
incident.  Task-employee matching may  take into account
familiarity with the task, physical demands of the task, etc.
Supervisors are provided with the ﬂexibility to assign the
right  employee to the task.
•  When ﬂexibility is allowed, past experience with the task
is  considered.
•  When ﬂexibility is allowed, the physical demands of the
task  are considered.
•  When ﬂexibility is allowed, the risk of fatigue or
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rStudies have shown a positive relationship between the mea-
ured level of employee engagement with business-unit outcomes
uch as higher productivity, better quality, lower employee
urnover, greater customer satisfaction, and increased proﬁtabil-
ty (Raines, 2011; Vance, 2006). Further, the notion of employee
ngagement’s relationship to safety performance has also been
dentiﬁed by researchers to a lesser extent. For example, in a study
eporting on the role of worker engagement on safety performance,
allup compared the critical business outcomes of workgroups
ithin more than 125 organizations. This meta-analysis compared
orkgroups that were in the top-quartile and bottom quartilen employee engagement measures (Harter et al., 2006). Accord-
ng to the study, engaged business units experienced 62% fewer
afety incidents than units with lower employee engagement. In a
eport issued by Society for Human Resource Management (SHRM)extended work hours is considered.
• When ﬂexibility is allowed, the risk associated with
stress  or distraction is considered.
Foundation,  the Molson Coors beverage company saved $1.7 mil-
lion in safety costs by strengthening employee engagement. It was
also found that engaged workers were ﬁve times less likely than
non-engaged workers to have a safety incident and seven times
less likely to have a lost-time safety incident. In addition, it was
reported that the average cost of a safety incident was  $392 for
non-engaged workers, but only $63 for engaged workers (Vance,
2006; Raines, 2011).
Employee  engagement may  play a critical role in combating cog-
nitive and decision-making biases which workers can fall prey to,
especially in routine task execution. When workers are engaged in
safe task execution, a conscious effort is being made on the part
of workers not to be overconﬁdent, skip safe work procedures,
and/or underestimate the risks involved in tasks. Workers who  are
engaged in the organizational safety management system might
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to observation ratio is a potential concern (Bentler and Chou,
1988; Hall et al., 1999; Hoffmann and Morgeson, 1999), the CFA
was carried out by creating item parcels (i.e. averaging the itemsJ.K. Wachter, P.L. Yorio / Accident An
e described as being interested in, connected to, and focused on
he safety aspects of their job. When workers are engaged in safe
ork they are willing to invest their mental, emotional, and physi-
al efforts toward ensuring that they conduct their work safely and
ithout incident. By being emotionally and cognitively connected
o their work and work environment, employee safety engagement
ay be an important personal defense against the error precur-
ors that may  be present in the organization. Thus, employee safety
ngagement may  represent a critical construct in predicting safety
erformance.
Whereas safety management practices and systems of practices
rovide for developing and executing processes oriented toward
he “safe” planning, controlling, performing and checking of work,
ased on the fact that workers actually have to implement these
rocesses, the level of worker engagement associated with man-
ging or working within a system of safety management practices
nd processes may  be very important to their safety performance
uccess. It would appear that by applying the research described so
ar that cognitively, emotionally and physically engaged workers
ould be motivated to make these safety management practices
ork or would have the situational awareness to see when these
afety management practices are not working effectively and adapt
heir behavior accordingly. Both situations should lead to a height-
ned state of safety performance leading to lower accident rates.
.  Methods
In 2011 and 2012, data were collected using surveys designed
o assess and link existing safety management system practices,
mployee engagement levels, and safety performance outcomes.
wo separate large scale studies were conducted during this time
eriod. For study number one, a survey was administered to
afety managers and was designed to investigate the relationship
etween a system of safety management practices (as well as indi-
idual practices) with objective safety performance statistics (e.g.,
ccident rates) through a measure of employee engagement. In
tudy number two, we utilized a group-level research approach
nd analyzed the relationship between the system of safety man-
gement practices, employee-reported engagement levels, and
elf-reported injuries and illnesses within establishment units (e.g.,
ork groups). This second study largely targeted ﬁrst line supervi-
ors and their workers.
.1.  Study number one
Through the American Society of Safety Engineers’ member-
hip database, a 69 item survey was distributed to ∼2400 safety
anagers mainly across the U.S. The response rate was 14% (342
afety managers fully completed this survey in study number one).
he survey included questions related to the organization’s demo-
raphics, demographics and employment information related to
he survey respondents, the safety management practices uti-
ized at the establishment, the perceived level of employee safety
ngagement, and the establishment’s accident and injury statis-
ics. The mean number of workers per establishment was  632.
ultiple sectors were represented in the sample, including agri-ulture, construction, transportation and distribution, education,
overnment, healthcare, light manufacturing, heavy manufactur-
ng, mining, research and development, and service.1
1 It should be noted that given the diverse sectors represented by our sample
n  study number one we preliminarily explored whether the regression prediction
f  the TRC and DART rates by the complete safety management system compos-
te  was  different among the industry sectors. In order to conduct this analysis we
rst centered the safety management system composite, created dummy  coded and Prevention 68 (2014) 117–130 123
2.1.1. Speciﬁc research questions in safety manager survey
The  speciﬁc questions being addressed in study number one as
reported in this article using the data from the ﬁrst safety manager
survey are:
Question 1. Is there a signiﬁcant and/or predictive relationship
between the individual safety management practices and the sys-
tem of practices with safety performance outcomes as measured
by accident (i.e., TRC and DART) rates?
Question 2. Is there a signiﬁcant and/or predictive relation-
ship between the safety manager’s assessment of levels of worker
safety engagement (emotional engagement; cognitive engage-
ment; emotional and cognitive engagement composite) with safety
performance outcomes as measured through accident (i.e., TRC and
DART) rates?
Question 3. Do worker engagement levels (emotional engage-
ment, cognitive engagement, and cognitive and emotional
engagement composite) mediate the relationship between the
safety management system and safety performance outcomes as
measured by accident (i.e., TRC and DART) rates?
2.1.2. Measures
Safety Management Practices. As was  shown in Table 1, the
presence and characteristics of each safety management system
practice was  measured using a composite of multiple questions.
The total number of survey items designed to reﬂect the safety
management practices was  initially 52. Each safety manager was
asked to evaluate the degree to which each item within each
practice reﬂected the safety management practice for the orga-
nization. Each item on the survey was measured using a 7 point
scale from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (7) except for the
following items: how often are pre-task safety reviews done? (7
points scale: 1 = never to 7 = always); percent of routine tasks that
safe work procedures have been developed (1 = 0%, 2 = 25%, 3 = 50%,
4 = 75%, 5 = 100%); percent of high risk jobs that have completed
hazard analyses (1 = 0%, 2 = 25%, 3 = 50%, 4 = 75%, 5 = 100%); num-
ber of hours of safety training per year (1 = 0, 2 = <10, 3 = 11–20,
4 = 21-30, 5 = 31–40, 6 = >40); and how soon investigations are ini-
tiated after their occurrence? (accidents are not investigated, <24 h,
24–48 h, >48 h).
In order to reﬁne the safety management system survey we fol-
lowed steps similar to those executed in Fernández-Mun˜iz et al.
(2007) and Zacharatos et al. (2005). We  ﬁrst computed reliability
coefﬁcients (i.e. Chronbach’s ˛) for each of the subscales and iden-
tiﬁed items that decreased the reliability for each subscale. Based
on this analysis, two items designed to measure training and one
item designed to measure accident investigation were removed
from the scales. After removing the items (which are shown in
italics in Table 1), the resulting internal consistencies for each of
the practice subscales achieved acceptable levels (Nunnally and
Bernstein, 1994), with a range from .713 to .913 (average is .794).
Using  the remaining 49 items we executed a conﬁrmatory fac-
tor analysis (CFA) in SPSS Amos 20 (Arbuckle, 2005) to explore
the underlying structure or dimensionality of the safety manage-
ment scale. Consistent with previous research in which the itemvariables corresponding to each of the industrial sectors, and created interaction
terms  between the safety management system composite and each of the dummy
coded  industry sector variables. We then individually executed eleven moderated
regressions  to explore if the given prediction of the outcomes by the safety man-
agement  system differed between the isolated industrial sector and the remaining
industries.  We found that zero of the 11 interaction terms were signiﬁcant. This
suggests  that the prediction of the outcomes by the safety management system is
consistent across the industrial sectors included in this analysis.
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ithin each practice subscale) and ﬁxing the error variance equal
o one minus the subscale reliability multiplied by its variance:
1 − reliability) × variance. While keeping the covariance structure
etween the practices constant, we compared the ten factor, null
odel to a second order factor model in which a safety manage-
ent system latent construct was imposed as the common latent
actor of the 10 distinct safety managements practice subscales.
e found that the second order factor model displayed excellent
t. There was a signiﬁcant difference between the observed and
odeled covariance matrix, 2 (35, N = 330) = 115.98, p < 001; how-
ver the ﬁt statistics suggest that the second order model provided
xcellent ﬁt (GFI = .94, CFI = .95, RMSEA = .03). The second order
odel also demonstrated signiﬁcantly better ﬁt than the 10 factor
ull model, 2 (10, N = 330) = 805.46, p < 001. The factor loadings
f the pathways between the latent system and each of the practice
omposites were .43–.87. The correlations both among the practice
omposites created through the reﬁned list of items and with the
verall system provide additional support for our characterization
odel. The average correlation among the management system
ractice composites is 0.44 and provides discriminant validity (i.e.,
he reason why scores of the different practices are reported). The
verage correlation between these practice composites and the
verall system composite is .70. Combined with the results of the
FA, these moderate correlations among the practices coupled with
trong correlations with the composite system provide support for
he way that the scores are being reported in this study (i.e., that
eporting of the total score for the complete composite system is
ustiﬁed) (Standard 1.11 in AERA, APA, and CME, 1999).
Each  practice was represented in the research model by cal-
ulating the mean response per respondent to each set of survey
uestions comprising a safety management system practice. In
rder to model the overall composite of practices utilized within
 speciﬁc establishment, we used an additive approach which
as been developed, tested and is popular in the strategic human
esources literature (see Zacharatos et al., 2005). Proponents of this
dditive approach to measuring a composite of safety management
ractices argue that this approach is theoretically consistent with
ow a management system operates in that there are many differ-
nt/numerous ways that the system can be ﬂexibly implemented
hrough its components (depending on context) and still be effec-
ive (Becker and Huselid, 1998; Zacharatos et al., 2005).
Employee Safety Engagement. Safety managers completing the
urvey were asked to evaluate the degree of employee engage-
ent within their corresponding establishment. Two items were
dapted from the measures provided by Rich et al. (2010) to mea-
ure the level of worker emotional and cognitive engagement. Both
tems required the safety manager to evaluate the level of worker
ngagement measured on a ﬁve-point scale (strongly disagree to
trongly agree). The two questions as provided in the survey for
tudy number one were: (1) Workers are emotionally engaged in
he safety program. For instance, workers display enthusiasm, energy,
nterest, and pride in the safety program; (2) Workers are cognitively
ngaged in the safety program. For instance, workers display focus,
ttention, and concentration on the safety aspects of their job.
TRC  and DART Rates. Each safety manager was asked to report
he average OSHA total recordable case (TRC) rate and Days Away,
estricted Duty, or Job Transfer (DART) case rate for the 2010,
011, and 2012 (year to date) time period. These rates (a standard-
zed function of the total number of injuries and number of hours
orked within the establishment) represent important, objective
afety performance statistics..1.3.  Tests for mediation
In  terms of testing for mediation (Research Question 3), Baron
nd Kenny (1986) developed the most prominent statistical test
or mediation used currently in empirical research. They outline and Prevention 68 (2014) 117–130
the  procedure as follows. First, the predictor (i.e. safety manage-
ment system practice composite) must have a signiﬁcant statistical
association with the outcome (i.e. TRC and DART rates). Second,
the mediator (e.g., worker engagement) must also be signiﬁcantly
related to the outcome (i.e., TRC and DART rates). These relation-
ships are typically shown through two  regression models where
the outcome is ﬁrst predicted by the predictor alone and second
by the mediator alone. In both regression models, the relation-
ship between the predictor/mediator and the outcome variable
should be signiﬁcant. Third, the predictor (i.e. safety management
system practice composite) should signiﬁcantly predict the medi-
ator (i.e. worker engagement). Fourth, when both the predictor
and the mediator are entered into a multiple regression model,
simultaneously predicting the outcome, the previously established
relationship between the predictor (i.e. safety management sys-
tem practice composites) and the outcome (i.e. TRC and DART
rates) should disappear while the mediator remains signiﬁcant
(Research Question 3). These steps are necessary to statistically
support the claim that through worker engagement, for exam-
ple, safety management systems impact organizational injuries
and illnesses.
2.2.  Study number two
In  order to more thoroughly explore how safety management
system practices work to reduce injuries and illnesses, a subset of
those establishments that participated in study number one were
asked to survey their supervisors (largely ﬁrst-line supervisors)
and workers for the characteristics of the safety management sys-
tem/management practices in place (supervisor survey) and their
levels of worker engagement (employee survey) toward safety.
Twenty-nine establishments accepted the invitation to participate
in the second study. Of those, 23 involved safety critical operations,
such as heavy manufacturing, nuclear power research and produc-
tion, mining, and construction. These 23 establishments were then
asked to choose up to three distinct groups (i.e. department, work
group, etc.) within their establishment to participate in the study.
Instructions were provided to participating organizations to choose
groups that share similar tasks and the same production goals. Con-
sistent with previous literature (e.g., Zohar and Luria, 2005) we
expect that meaningful group-level variation can exist between
distinct units within the same establishment either due to differ-
ences in unit level policy design or in idiosyncratic supervisory
implementation.
Each of the work groups (total was initially 66) was  asked
to complete two  different surveys. Consistent with the survey
administered in study number one, the ﬁrst survey measured the
characteristics of safety management system. Whenever possi-
ble, the survey was independently administered to multiple group
managers and supervisors within the same work group (e.g., groups
associated with shift work involving multiple managers; groups
having multiple managers by design) in order to counteract poten-
tial bias in rating of human resource practices (Wright et al., 2001).
Another survey was completed by employees within each group
which collected information regarding their level of perceived
engagement.
We received no supervisory responses from six groups within
the prospective sample. Thus six groups were dropped from
the analysis resulting in a total of 60 groups of matched sets
of completed supervisory and employee surveys. A total of 144
department managers completed the survey. Fifty-six employee
responses had to be eliminated due to lack of supervisory
responses. In total, 650 employee responses were used to create
the 60 work groups. The average number of workers in each group
in the usable sample was  10.83 (range between 7 and 13).
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.2.1. Speciﬁc research questions
The speciﬁc research questions from the set of supervisory and
mployee surveys are similar to those addressed in the safety man-
ger survey. The questions are:
Question 4. Is there a signiﬁcant and/or predictive relationship
etween the individual safety management practices and the sys-
em of practices with safety performance outcomes as measured
y the number of self-reported recordable accidents (beyond ﬁrst
id) and lost-time accidents in the workplace?
Question 5. Is there a signiﬁcant and/or predictive relation-
hip between the level of worker-reported safety engagement
emotional engagement; cognitive engagement; emotional and
ognitive engagement composited) with safety performance out-
omes as measured through the number of self-reported recordable
nd lost-time accidents?
Question  6. Do worker engagement levels (emotional engage-
ent, cognitive engagement, and cognitive and emotional
ngagement composites) mediate the relationship between the
afety management system and safety performance outcomes as
easured by the number of recordable and lost-time accidents?
.2.2.  Measures
Safety Management Practices. The same survey that was  used to
easure the safety management system practices in the ﬁrst safety
anager survey was applied to the second survey for supervisors
n the organization. Thus, the identical ten safety management sys-
em composites were generated using essentially the same set of
uestions.
Because of the smaller number of supervisory responses in the
tudy number two sample compared to the number of items within
he safety management system survey, the execution of a reliable
actor analysis was questionable. Thus we rely on the factor analy-
is performed in the study number one as well as the correlations
etween the practice composites and the overall system compos-
te to justify the characterization model and used the 49 items that
erformed adequately. Similar to the ﬁrst study, the average cor-
elation among the practice composites (0.39) as well as between
he composites and the overall system (.65) are consistent with the
ay the scores are being reported in this study. For study number
wo, the Cronbach’s  ˛ for each safety management practice com-
osite range from .734 to .921 (average is .814). Similar to study
umber one, when the system of safety management practices is
onsidered in the measurement model, an additive approach was
tilized.
Employee Engagement. Whereas the ﬁrst safety manager survey
sked for safety manager’s opinion as to the level of worker engage-
ent in the organization, the employee survey more appropriately
sked workers themselves as to their degree of engagement.
lso, the number of questions in the employee survey related to
ngagement was expanded with respect to characterizing worker
ngagement levels. Similar to study number one, the engagement
uestions were adapted from Rich et al. (2010).
Employee engagement in the safety program is a theoretical
onstruct designed to reﬂect both cognitive and emotional engage-
ent in the safety program. Cognitive safety engagement reﬂects
ctive focus on, attention to, and concentration on the safe exe-
ution of work tasks. Emotional safety engagement is designed
o reﬂect both enthusiasm for and interest in the safety program
n each establishment. Multiple questions were used to create an
verall employee engagement composite and reﬂected the deﬁni-
ions provided for both cognitive and emotional engagement.
The  employee questions (using a Likert scale) that were utilized
o develop mean responses per work group were: (1) I am enthusi-
stic about the safety program (emotional); (2) I am very interested
n the safety program (emotional); (3) At work, my mind is focused on
ow to do my job in the safest possible way (cognitive); (4) At work, I and Prevention 68 (2014) 117–130 125
focus a great deal of attention on the safety rules and procedures nec-
essary to do my work safely (cognitive); and (5) At work, I concentrate
on the safety aspects of my job (cognitive). The internal consistencies
for all related engagement constructs (i.e. cognitive, emotional, and
overall engagement) were all greater than .90.
Employee responses to these questions were aggregated in
order to form the group’s level of safety engagement. Justiﬁcation
for aggregation was supported through ANOVA procedures show-
ing that the within group variability was  less than the between
group variability (F = 3.80, p < .001). These constructs, then, repre-
sent compositional forms of context and can be aggregated (to the
group level) in order to study how well they are predicted by the
corresponding safety management system practices.
Occupational Injuries and Illnesses. Safety outcomes in the
employee survey were not determined using TRC and DART rates
as in the safety manager survey because workers or their supervi-
sors typically did not have ready access to their individual group’s
rates. Rather safety outcomes were determined through work-
ers self-reporting on the frequency of certain types of injuries
they experienced in the workplace (e.g., number of recordable
and lost workday cases in their workplace) in the preceding six-
month period. Based on previous investigations, six months is
the maximum time over which workers should be asked to recall
injuries they have sustained with any accuracy (Veazie et al., 1994;
Zacharatos et al., 2005).
Since  the size of employee groups changed among those groups
participating in the study, mean numbers of recordable and lost
workday cases were calculated (e.g., standardized) per person per
work group in order to account for changes in group size. Using
the mean per person per work group approach (rather than a raw
count) decreases the probability of a non-normally, zero-inﬂated
outcome and in the case of the current study, we found that the
outcome distributions did not deviate from normality.
3.  Results
3.1. Study number one results
We tested the distribution of both the TRC and DART rates and
found that within the original sample the assumption of normality
was violated because of a positive skew. Upon inspection of the dis-
tribution of the 342 data points, we identiﬁed and eliminated the
highest 12 outliers (i.e., TRC rates greater than 18). The distribution
of the TRC and DART rates for the remaining 330 establishments
did not violate the assumption of normality (Shapiro Wilk W = .995,
p = .22 and Shapiro Wilk W = .997, p = .32, respectively). As such we
made no transformations to the dependent variable and proceeded
with the analysis. (It should be noted that the correlation and
regression results obtained in Research Study Number One were
essentially the same with or without the inclusion of the 12 outlier
data points.)
In  order to answer the ﬁrst two research questions, simple corre-
lations were ﬁrst performed. Pearson correlations were calculated
and the signiﬁcance of these correlations was  determined using
a two-tailed test. In order to further address these questions (as
well as to provide information required to support the mediation
analyses), regression analyses were then performed. Regression
coefﬁcients were determined and reported along with their sig-
niﬁcance levels and the coefﬁcients of determination (R2).
Results  from the analysis of safety manager survey information
are shown in Tables 2–4. The following observations can be gleaned
from the correlations presented in Table 2:
All correlations among constructs are signiﬁcant at the p < 05
level. The vast majority of correlations are signiﬁcant at the p < 001
level. This suggests that the surveys were well designed in terms of
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Table  2
Correlations and descriptive statistics for constructs (study number one).
Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
1. TRC rate 2.65 1.58
2. DART rate 1.42 .98 .78
3.  Emotional engagement 5.36 1.02 −.34 −.32
4.  Cognitive engagement 4.52 .89 −.27 −.22 .68
5. Engagement composite 4.94 .95 −.32 −.31 .93 .90
6.  System of safety
management practices
(total)
42.68 6.59 −.30 −.27 .54 .54 .58
7. Safe work procedures 4.21 .79 −.23 −.21 .41 .38 .42 .76
8. Employee involvement 4.35 1.00 −.31 −.29 .48 .44 .50 .81 .58
9.  Safe task assignment 4.68 1.38 −.15 −.12 .38 .36 .39 .64 .43 .36
10. Pre- and post-task safety
reviews
4.91  .75 −.27 −.31 .49 .50 .53 .84 .71 .68 .48
11.  Detection and monitoring 3.88 .84 −.17 −.15 .35 .30 .35 .70 .56 .53 .37 .54
12.  Accident investigation 3.35 .75 −.12 −.19 .14 .20 .19 .46 .29 .36 .17 .30 .25
13. Communication and
information  sharing
5.36 .98 −.23 −.18 .38 .41 .42 .81 .54 .65 .37 .61 .52 .36
14.  Safety training 3.71 .80 −.27 −.21 .32 .33 .35 .69 .49 .51 .29 .54 .37 .28 .64
15.  Cooperation facilitation 3.71 .73 −.22 −.17 .47 .48 .51 .76 .53 .61 .39 .56 .54 .30 .65 .48
16. Hiring for safety 4.52 .83 −.11 −.10 .33 .34 .36 .56 .28 .46 .29 .40 .32 .13 .39 .37 .40
Note: number of establishments = 330. All correlations are signiﬁcant at the p <.05 level. C
at the p <.001 level.
Table  3
Regression results: prediction of TRC and DART rates by safety management systems
and engagement constructs (study number one).
Outcomes
TRC rate R2 DART rate R2
Predictor
Safety management systems −.12* .09 −.07* .07
Engagement composite −1.08* .11 −.58* .09
Emotional engagement −.97* .11 −.55* .11
* *
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NCognitive engagement −.87 .07 −.41 .05
ote: Unstandardized regression coefﬁcients reported. *p < .01.
hose safety management system practices selected and the survey
tems used to characterize these practices and that these surveys
ere measuring what they were intending to measure regarding
he safety management system practices constructs.
The two safety performance outcomes, TRC and DART rate, are
ll negatively and signiﬁcantly correlated with the measures of
ngagement and with each of the ten safety management sys-
em practices suggesting that all of the constructs being measured
engagement and safety management system practices) may  be
mportant in reducing workplace incidents. As expected, the TRC
nd DART rates were highly correlated (.78). The measures of emo-
ional and cognitive engagement were also highly correlated (.68)
ith each other.
The  safety management system practices that had the highestegative correlations with TRC rates were employee involvement
−.31), conducting pre- and post-safety reviews (−.27) and safety
raining (-27).
able 4
ediation regression results (study number one).
Mediators 
Engagement
composite
Emotional
engagement
Cognitiv
engagem
Predictors
Engagement composite NA NA NA 
Emotional  engagement NA NA NA 
Cognitive  engagement NA NA NA 
Safety  management systems .09** .08** .08**
Adjusted R2 .36 .38 .33 
ote: Unstandardized regression coefﬁcients reported. *p < .05, **p < .01.orrelations greater than or equal to .17 or less than or equal to −.17 are signiﬁcant
Regression analyses are presented in Table 3. As shown in
Table 3, both safety management system (total) and engagement
composites described in this study can be used to predict TRC and
DART rates (which satisﬁes the ﬁrst two  requirements for conduct-
ing mediation analyses). All regression coefﬁcients were signiﬁcant
at p < .01. The regression slopes for TRC rates were higher than those
for DART rates. This result is not surprising since TRC rates are
almost always higher than DART rates. The coefﬁcients of deter-
mination (R2) tended to be low, indicating that 11% or less of the
variability of the TRC and DART rates could be explained by the
effects of the individual predictor.
The mediation regression results are shown in Table 4. As shown
in Table 4, safety management systems can be used to predict (at a
signiﬁcance level of p < 01 for the regression coefﬁcient) the engage-
ment composite, emotional engagement and cognitive engagement
levels (which satisﬁes the third requirement for conducting media-
tion analyses). The coefﬁcients of determination (R2) were between
0.33 and 0.38, indicating that more than 30% of the variability in
the engagement levels could be explained by safety management
system effects. When both of the engagement and safety manage-
ment system constructs were used to predict safety performance
outcomes as described by the TRC rate, the engagement compos-
ite as well as the emotional engagement construct predicted safety
performance at the p < 01 level, while the cognitive engagement
construct predicted safety performance at the p < 05 level. How-
ever, the safety management system effects on TRC rate did not
“fade away” to insigniﬁcance suggesting only partial mediation by
engagement constructs on TRC rate using information obtained
from the safety manager survey. A similar pattern was  observed
for the DART rates.
Outcomes
e
ent
TRC rate DART rate
−.24** NA NA −.21** NA NA
NA −.73** NA NA −.26** NA
NA NA −.15* NA NA −.09
−.15* −.14* −.20** −.16* −.12* −.22**
.13 .11 .11 .12 .13 .10
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Table  5
Correlation and descriptive statistics for constructs (employee survey) (study number two).
Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
1. Recordable accidents 1.23 .34
2.  Lost time accidents 1.16 .27 .91
3.  Emotional engagement 3.89 .36 −.48 −.41
4.  Cognitive engagement 4.27 .38 −.67 −.59 .74
5. Employee engagement composite 4.12 .35 −.63 −.56 .91 .95
6.  Safety management systems 45.84 5.41 −.45 −.42 .53 .62 .62
7. Safe work procedures 4.75 .87 −.44 −.38 .65 .66 .70 .74
8.  Employee involvement 5.11 .98 −.37 −.41 .36 .55 .50 .66 .59
9. Safe task assignment 5.16 .99 −.28 −.18 .33 .43 .40 .68 .49 .31
10.  Pre- and post- task safety reviews 5.55 1.03 −.45 −.49 .33 .46 .43 .80 .57 .49 .58
11.  Detection and monitoring 4.44 .75 −.41 −.35 .53 .44 .52 .67 .64 .58 .26 .32
12.  Accident investigation 2.11 2.08 −.15 −.13 .24 .07 .15 .46 .15 .21 .36 .34 .21
13.  Communication and information sharing 5.98 .78 −.40 −.41 .56 .57 .60 .77 .64 .69 .34 .58 .70 .02
14. Safety training 4.20 .89 −.08 −.07 .19 .20 .21 .62 .15 .13 .43 .48 .22 .58 .40
15.  Cooperation facilitation 4.03 .55 −.36 −.37 .46 .67 .62 .88 .67 .76 .42 .64 .54 .20 .74 .56
16. Hiring for safety 4.51 .73 .08 .05 −.01 .12 .09 .23 .12 .16 .31 .18 .00 .39 .05 .15 .04
Note: N = 60. All correlations greater than or equal to .27 or less than or equal to −.27 are
than or equal to −.35 are signiﬁcant at the p = .01 level.
Table 6
Regression results: prediction of number of recordable and lost time incidents by
safety management systems and engagement constructs (supervisor and employee
surveys) (study number two).
Outcomes
Recordable
incidents
R2 Lost time
incidents
R2
Predictor
Safety management systems −.03* .20 −.02* .18
Engagement composite −.59* .40 −.41* .31
Emotional engagement −.41* .23 −.28* .17
N
3
i
c
c
s
a
w
s
b
m
n
p
t
m
d
T
M
NCognitive engagement −.59* .45 −.41* .35
ote: Unstandardized regression coefﬁcients reported. *p < .01.
.2. Study number two results
Results from the analysis of supervisor and employee survey
nformation are shown in Tables 5–7. The following observations
an be derived from the correlations presented in Table 5:
Correlations  among most of the system constructs are signiﬁ-
ant at the p < 05 level or lower. The majority of correlations are
igniﬁcant at the p < 01 level.
The  two safety performance outcomes, number of recordable
nd lost time accidents, are negatively and signiﬁcantly correlated
ith all of the measures of engagement and with most of the ten
afety management system practices suggesting that the constructs
eing measured (engagement and many of the individual safety
anagement system practices) may  be important in reducing the
umber of workplace incidents. The safety management system
ractices having the highest degree of negative correlation with
hese safety performance outcomes (at p = .01 or lower) are: safety
anagement system practice composite (total), safe work proce-
ures, employee involvement, pre- and post-task safety reviews,
able 7
ediation regression results (supervisor and employee surveys) (study number two).
Mediators 
Engagement
composite
Emotional
engagement
Cogn
enga
Predictors
Employee engagement composite NA NA NA 
Emotional engagement NA NA NA 
Cognitive  engagement NA NA NA 
Safety management systems .04** .03** .04**
Adjusted  R2 .38 .29 .38 
ote: Unstandardized regression coefﬁcients reported. †p < .07, *p < .05, **p < .01. signiﬁcant at the p < .05 level. All correlations greater than or equal to .35 or less
detection  and monitoring of deviation, communication and infor-
mation, and cooperation facilitation.
As expected, the number of recordable and lost time accidents
was highly correlated (.91). The measures of emotional and cogni-
tive engagement were highly correlated (.74) with each other.
Regression  analyses are shown in Table 6. As shown in this table,
the safety management system composite (e.g., ten safe work prac-
tices together) and all engagement constructs can be used to predict
the number of recordable and lost time incidents (a necessary ini-
tial requirement for conducting mediation analyses). All of the
regression coefﬁcients are negative (e.g., the presence of engage-
ment and/or management system practices predicts the reduction
in the number of incidents). All of these regression coefﬁcients are
highly signiﬁcant at p < .01. The coefﬁcients of determination for the
regressions predicting recordable incidents range from .20 to .45
indicating that between 20 and 45% of the variation in the record-
able incident data could be explained by the effects of the predictors
being examined. The coefﬁcients of determination for the regres-
sions predicting lost time incidents were lower, ranging from .17
to .35.
The mediation regression results are shown in Table 7. As
shown in this table, the presence of a system of safety man-
agement practices can be used to accurately predict the level
of worker engagement (a requirement for conducting medi-
ation analyses). The regression coefﬁcients are signiﬁcant at
p < 01. When engagement and safety management system pre-
dictors are regressed together against the safety performance
outcomes (recordable incidents and lost time incidents), the fol-
lowing can be observed:The  engagement composite and cognitive engagement predic-
tors signiﬁcantly predict the number of recordable and lost time
incidents (p < 01), while the effect of safety management systems
on the safety performance outcomes diminishes. This suggests that
Outcomes
itive
gement
Recordable accidents Lost time accidents
−.54** NA NA −.35** NA NA
NA −.29* NA NA −.01† NA
NA NA −.56** NA NA −.37**
−.01 −.02† −.00 −.01 −.01 −.00
.41 .29 .45 .32 .23 .36
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afety management system’s effects on safety performance out-
omes are mediated by certain worker engagement constructs. In
ther words, the system of safety management practices may  work
o reduce the number of recordable and lost time incidents by
ngaging workers.
To  a lesser extent, the emotional engagement predictor predicts
he number of recordable and lost time incidents (p < 05 and p < 07,
espectively), while the effect of safety management systems on
he safety performance outcomes tends to have a much less signif-
cant impact (when compared to the effects of safety management
ystems alone on safety performance when performing the regres-
ion using only this single predictor, see Table 6). This also suggests
ediation by the emotional engagement predictor.
The mediating role of cognitive engagement seems to be
tronger than the mediating role of emotional engagement.
.  Discussion
The results of these two research studies answered a number of
he intended research questions regarding the association of a sys-
em of safety management practices and worker engagement levels
n objective measures of safety performance (TRC and DART rates;
umber of recordable and lost time incidents). There appears to be
 signiﬁcant correlation between the various safety management
ystem practices identiﬁed for investigation in these studies (as
ell as the entirety of the system of these safety management prac-
ices when viewed together) on both worker engagement levels and
afety performance outcomes (e.g., accident rates). Upon further
nvestigation, the effects of safety management system practices
n safety performance outcomes are often mediated through the
erceptual construct of worker engagement.
The results of our studies illustrating the effect of engagement
n safety performance objectively reinforce the importance of the
ole of worker engagement on meaningful business (Raines, 2011;
ance, 2006) and safety performance (Harter et al., 2006; Raines,
011; Vance, 2006) outcomes as determined in previous studies.
he speciﬁc mediating role of worker engagement on safety per-
ormance discerned in our studies supports other research that
nvestigated the role of worker engagement on non-safety perfor-
ance outcomes (Rich et al., 2010). In addition, the results of these
tudies bolster the work of DeJoy (2005) who advanced the notion
hat a balanced and comprehensive system for managing work-
lace safety would include a participatory problem-solving process
e.g., associated with employee involvement) and a culture change
rocess (e.g., associated with management systems).
.1. A human performance system approach to understanding
esults
Using a human performance system approach to understanding
ow accidents occur in the workplace, our research results make
ense. The presence of a system of safety management practices in
rganizations is a necessary foundation for achieving a safe work-
ng environment, but it cannot guarantee it. Thus, the requirements
nd resulting practices and processes implemented through safety
anagement system consensus standards such as OHSAS 18001,
NSI/AIHA Z10 and OSHA VPP provide the necessary “ﬁrst steps” in
rriving at safety excellence. But it is interesting to note that these
onsensus standards are primarily manager- or process-centric,
ather than employee-centric, in terms of deﬁning roles, responsi-
ilities, and requirements (although most do include small sections
n employee participation).
Our  research results suggest the idea of a “safety system” needs
o be expanded to more emphatically include workers beyond that
mblematic of a strict safety management system. Workers are are and Prevention 68 (2014) 117–130
the system! Workers, who  come into daily contact with hazards and
hazardous situations and who  are at the sharp-edge of accidents,
appear to play an equally important role as does the speciﬁc sys-
tem of safety management practices in preventing accidents from
occurring. The results in this study indicate that workers’ cognitive
and emotional engagement, which as explained previously may be
viewed as a result of safety management system practices being
in place, may  act as a necessary implementation component for
keeping the system of safety management practices effective (e.g.,
practices continually and successfully being reduced to practice)
in preventing accidents from occurring. Thus, a system of safety
management practices “work” not only through the written poli-
cies, plans, procedures, and processes in place to identify, evaluate
and reduce hazards and risk (traditional safety system approach),
but through the behaviors of and consequential actions by work-
ers themselves, especially highly engaged workers, who  interact
necessarily with the safey system and its practices.
4.2. A system improvement approach to understanding results
There  is a alternate way  of looking at these mediation results.
In attempting to prevent human error from occurring in the work-
place due to the deﬁciencies inherent in all safety management
systems, human performance tools that are being utilized typi-
cally by high performing organizations to prevent human error
from occurring (e.g., pre- and post-task safety reviews) are decid-
edly worker-centric in either their design or implementation. These
tools work by informing, involving, and engaging workers to be
more aware of the tasks to be performed, their hazards, their risks,
and the presence of error traps or precursors. Most of these tools
work by heightening the sense of awareness of workers. This is
consistent with the work by Rich et al. (2010) who  stated that since
engaged individuals invest their physical, cognitive, and emotional
energies into their work roles, they should exhibit enhanced per-
formance because they work with greater intensity on their tasks
for longer periods of time, they pay more attention to and are
more focused on responsibilities, and they are more emotionally
connected to the tasks that constitute their role. The best human
performance tools may  be those that allow the workers to con-
tinually learn and adapt from their work situations in order to be
more aware of and safely deal with deﬁciencies within or changes
occurring in the workplace.
Perhaps  worker engagement mediates by “improving” the per-
formance of the safety management system (and thus increasing
safety outcome performance) due to its effectiveness in dealing
with deﬁciencies present in the management system itself, such
as the presence of error traps and ﬂawed defenses. Thus, a system
safety approach to accident prevention should rigorously include
both organizational and behavioral system components. However,
this is somewhat contrary to the approaches for designing and
implementing most safety management systems that are currently
being described through international safety management system
consensus standards.
4.3.  A system realism perspective to understanding results
The  results of these studies ultimately support the “system real-
ism perspective” advocated by Conklin (2012) and the systemic
accident model described by Dekker (2006). Through engagement
in everyday normal activities, things can go right because peo-
ple can learn to overcome design ﬂaws and functional glitches,
adapt their performance to meet demands, interpret and apply
procedures to match conditions, detect and correct when things
go inevitably wrong, and understand error prone situations and
defend against them. Therefore, in this realistic system, humans are
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n asset (and not a liability) without which the proper functioning
f the systems would be impossible.
. Conclusions
The results of our analyses are relevant to both practitioners
nd researchers. Each safety management practice characterized
epresents a valuable tool that practitioners can use to improve
rganizational safety performance and to reduce accidents through
uman safety performance (i.e., mediated through worker engage-
ent). These practices reasonably represent a much needed simple
pproach to accident prevention that can be utilized by organi-
ations as a focal point in building, improving, or maintaining an
ffective workplace safety program. These theoretical ideas and
mpirical results also provide an approach to human safety per-
ormance management with rich prospect for further theoretical
evelopment and empirical exploration for academic researchers.
However,  our research results also indicate that the effective-
ess of a safety management system and its practices in reducing
ccident rates depends on the levels of safety-focused cognitive and
motional worker engagement. Thus, when organizations invest
n a safety management system approach to preventing accidents
rom occurring and to improving safety performance, they should
lso be concerned about overtly winning over the minds and hearts
f their workers through a system of worker engagement. It seems
hat not only do organizations affect society in terms of inﬂuencing
he psyche and personalities of its participants (Scott, 1981), but the
esults of our study conversely and more speciﬁcally indicate that
he perceptions of workers may  affect the safety performance of
rganizations even within a highly structured safety management
ystem environment.
Thus,  it may  not be enough for organizations to only mechani-
ally implement the requirements of safety management system
equirements, such as those prescribed in ANSI/AIHA Z10 and
HSAS 18001 standards, by issuing policies, plans, procedures, and
rocesses. Even though these requirements may  indeed be prereq-
isites (e.g., foundations) for ultimate safety performance success,
hey may  not guarantee it. It may  be equally necessary for orga-
izations to nurture the cognitive and emotional commitment of
orkers. However, this nurturing of worker engagement does not
ave to be distinct or independent from the safety management
ystem practices themselves. Based on our results, the “either-
r” schism between safety management system and behavioral
pproaches common in many organizations should be bridged.
he system of worker engagement and involvement could be
trongly embedded into the design and implementation of the
afety management system and its individual components even
f consensus standards currently do not emphasize this approach.
afety management system practices can be designed and imple-
ented to promote and enhance worker engagement, thereby
utting “workers” at the center of safety management systems. This
s a foundational concept behind the human performance approach
o safety management (Fig. 2) in that human performance is at the
enter of any safety management system.
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